The Mediterranean Sea has provided a captivating context for those seeking to articulate a history of cultural interactions in the pre-modern world. The thirst for such an articulation is understandable: rapid changes in sociological patterns worldwide have brought the theory and practice of the modern nation-state under frequent attack. Large-scale migrationthe result of extreme climate change and civil wars (often connected)leading to greater cultural diversity and frequent interaction across ethno-religious lines are all hallmarks of our world. Voices throughout the West are questioning the suitability of the state to provide (or protect) individual and collective rights. Others view the state, and especially state formationnot only on its imperial modelas the source of the most transparent, and therefore pernicious, form of modern oppression. This mind-set has yielded, for example, powerful critiques of secularism (or laïcité in its distinctly French form), which despite its naïve anti-clerical origins, is implicitly defined by assumptions that sanction practices and ideologies that are deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. More generally, recent years have seen a surge of studies that seek to reveal the idea of European singularity not so much as an ideal to boast of, but as a trope whose (not always flattering) history bears unfolding.
committed to safeguarding the monotheistic minorities living in their midst. An inseparable part of this paradigm is the assumption that these tolerant Iberian regimes viewed their economic and cultural prosperity as the result of this inclusiveness. The Convivencia model is often contrasted with areas where inter-communal interaction unfolded between separate political entities, often imagined to have been driven by fanatical ideologies that yielded perpetual conflict. The desire to defend the "Holy Land" (however the various traditions defined it) by divinely sanctioned violence is regarded as a recipe for conflict with which modern headlines are all too familiar. Whether the Crusades were the first manifestation of European colonialism (e.g. Bartlett) and apocalyptic brutality (e.g. Rubenstein), or were simply an attempt to defend against Islamic aggressions (e.g. Madden, Holt), this is presented as the reverse of the peaceful western Mediterranean. And yet, there are those who draw attention to the admittedly unusual instances where attempts to map scriptural and post-scriptural traditions onto the Near Eastern landscape has invited a sharing of liturgical and ritual spaces that shows instead how much the ideologies involved had in common.
Opposite sides of the coin perhaps, but the two paradigms are not really opposed, insofar as both are attempts to ask when and in which circumstances an allegedly peaceful coexistence of religious communities in the Mediterranean was disrupted by (or, to paraphrase Ray "fell victim to") the exclusivism that had swept across much of Europe. 1 Is modernity to blame, or Islam? Is Europe, in other words, redeemable? Indeed, much of the scholarship on the medieval Mediterranean unfolds in categories that are aligned along similar binaries, which in fact reveal the deeply European stakes within which the investigation has been trapped.
The choice to view communal encounters as a series of struggles over the domination of holy spaces (usually found in the East) rather than as a commitment to cultural coexistence (attributed to the western Mediterranean) translates into a more basic methodological split. The question, to frame it rather crudely, is what bound communities together in pre-modern societies and what, consequently, drove individuals into political action? "Mediterraneanists" like Brian Catlos draw attention to the fact that few societies were truly homogenous, and so "a common lifestyle, consumption patterns, languages and social traditions often bound groups together". 2 Consequently, says Catlos, the factors that shaped individual experiences were a complicated matrix of cultural and social competition, conflict, integration and interdependence that developed among the array of ethnically diverse communities around the Mediterranean. 3 This is a response, of course, to the tendency, perhaps more conventional, to view religious identity as definitive in the shaping of communal boundaries and, therefore, of political dynamics.
Almost invariably this debate has been deployed with an unspoken assumption about the power structures that were in place, allowing or restricting the various forms of interaction. Broadly speaking, this is an assumption regarding the interplay between legislative establishments (sometimes equated with a ruling elite) and individual actors in pre- modern societies. The church and its comparable institutions in Judaism and Islam, says John Tolan, produced thousands of normative texts that reflect a systematic attempt "to define and police borders between faith communities". 4 For Tolan, this corpus, in its enduring persistence and structural integrity, "attests both to the continued efforts of elites to restrict and regulate inter-religious encounters, and to their frequent inability to do so". 5 Scholars, in other words, tend to accept the paradigm that institutions responsible for articulating normative behaviours were ordinarily exclusive, and therefore most inter-communal interaction was, by definition, the result of individual vectors that undermined, overlooked, or simply put the dry legislation into "real life" use. It would seem, then, that there is a systematic correlation between the choice to focus on bellicose clashes rather than peaceful coexistence, and on the use of institutional sources rather than individual narratives (often celebrated as more subversive). Beyond the question of whether scholars are projecting notions of modern state-regulated subjectivity onto the medieval past while applying categories that are appropriate for Latin Christianity to the study of Jewish and Muslim institutions, there is a larger concern. It seems that, in the context of the medieval Mediterranean, the choice to write a history either of holy warfare by kindred ideologies or of peaceful cooperation between neighbouring communities boils down to the question of what kind of history of the West one seeks to devise: a history of the state and its ability to inherit the aspiration for universal sovereignty and unifying power of the church; or a history of how modern subjectivity, in its capacity for innovation and tireless struggle against the inhibiting effect of the medieval church, liberated the West from its ancient inclination for conservatism. Either version instrumentalises the interaction of Christians with other faith communities in the medieval Mediterranean in order to provide a narrative of European modernity. Ever since The Corrupting Sea by Horden and Purcell was published in 2000, 6 the debate about the nature of cultural multiplicity in the Mediterranean has taken on a distinctly methodological character. Following in the footsteps of Ferdinand Braudel, 7 Horden and Purcell studied the unique ecological space of the Mediterranean as well as its maritime and agrarian histories to articulate a new framework for interpreting the mechanics of diversity and exchange in the region. This focus on the environmental conditions that governed the Mediterranean for millennia led them to see it as a space of distinct micro-economies that became critically dependent on each other, creating a unique sense of unity by virtue of the web of long-lasting ties that kept them interconnected.
But in all its attention to how the physical environment forced local societies into continuous and mutually-dependent contact, and how this dynamic created a sense of pan-Mediterranean unity, the model that The Corrupting Sea puts forth struggles to account for the movement of ideas and the contact between religious traditions. The desire to outline the famous "connectivity" of long-lasting, neighbouring micro-economies around the Mediterranean may have obscured any attempt to account for the consequences of contact between confessional identities that each endorsed universal claims about history. That some of these ideas, which were rooted in metaphors of spatial typologies involving the same areas that the book attempts to parse, were conceived during their formative periods in spaces shared by multiple scriptural and hermeneutical communities, is equally overlooked by this model. 8 This, as Adnan Husain has pointed out, is especially noticeable in the treatment of Islam, largely reproducing Pirenne's thesis from the 1930s, 9 by casting it as a static monolith that is essentially incompatible with the Christian Mediterranean. Contacts between Muslims and Christians are occasioned by economic interests and the vicissitudes of environmental dynamics, but always take place in spite, or regardless, of religion. 10 This attitude toward religion, not only Islam, is typical in works about the medieval Mediterranean. Scholars often depict those engaging in inter-religious encounter either as cynics who are fully aware of the stakeholders that they mobilise in the name of God, or as blind (or indifferent) to the reasons that lay behind their beliefs. Whether cynical or blind, religiosity in The Corrupting Sea is consistently shown to be a force that is both exterior to, and at times inhibiting, the rational-economic dynamic that moves the Mediterranean forward. In all its emphasis on the connections that were forged between disparate political units, The Corrupting Sea too is a history of the West insofar as it chronicles its success on the basis of its incompatibility with the various cultures with which it came in contact. In other words, it too is trapped in exclusivist categories that were inherited from the Reformation or the Enlightenment, according to which religions are profoundly incompatible with one another, and are moreover incompatible with modernity (irrespective of what one thinks about the moral value of religions).
The same assumptions have been at work in shaping the disciplinary study of the various European literary traditions, taken as the foundations of the myth of nation. To rehearse a well-known truism, philologists in the nineteenth century saw epics that stood at the origins of literary traditions (Roland, Beowulf, Niebelungenlied, etc.) as sublime expressions of their national identity. This inclination, of course, goes back to the Protestant demand for scripture to be made available in the vernacular (sola scriptura), along with the distinctly territorial character of the reformed churches especially after Augsburg (1555). This led to the rise of national languages and to the expectation that subjects would conduct all aspects of their civic, liturgical, intellectual and private affairs in that one unifying idiom. Historians of language and literature were tasked with identifying the moment when the roots of a nation could be recognised in the pre-modern haze, and with disentangling them from other idioms now seen as foreign. That this results in an essentialising dialectic is evidenced, for example, in the famous statement of the Spanish orientalist, Julian Ribera (1858-1934), about medieval Iberia: "The Muslims of the Peninsula were Spaniards, in race, tongue, character, taste, tendencies, and genius … and we should consider the merits of the Spanish Muslims to be our own national, Spanish wealth". 11 That is, in order to show that Castilian literature was inflected by its contact with Arabic, the Spanish nationalist felt the need to peg the Muslims who ruled over and lived in Iberia as Spanish. In all its generous appreciation for the contribution of Arabic verse, this formulationjust like its oppositetakes for granted an essential, irreconcilable distinction between cultures, languages and faiths, such that for Muslims to be seen as part of the Spanish cultural heritage they must somehow cease to be Andalusians. To follow David Nirenberg's argument, even as they give thanks to Arabic for lighting the spark of humanism that liberated Europe from the "despotism" of Latin, such accounts of European vernacular-nationalism always "proceed by splitting the strands of interwoven and coproduced histories of identity and difference in order to rewire them along more polarised lines". 12 In a curious twist, however, recent decades have seen a repeated return to philology (i.e. "new philology") with the expectation that it could liberate the humanities from this dialectic teleology in which the study of history and languages is institutionally trapped. The idea is, of course, captivating. Philology involves a critical attention to the structure of language and to the engagement of a passage with its own history, in a way that is meant to disclose the uniqueness both of the text and of its present reading. 13 Importantly, the repeated call to revive philology cultivates the fantasy that this procedure, in its unyielding devotion to the singular grammar of pre-modern idioms, could somehow penetrate the political agenda in whose service it was and is deployed.
If philology as a procedure is unlikely to save us from the syncretic, national traditions within which we are trapped, then perhaps as a metaphor it could help us begin to imagine the kinds of sensibilities that might bring us nearer to the cultural complexity that was eschewed by the myth of European singularity. With Karla Mallette, we might furthermore suggest that, more than a historical space of inter-religious contact, the Mediterranean should serve as a metaphor for "a more radical and scandalous complexity" than our cultural dialectics allowa principle that might guide our reading strategies. If we train ourselves to listen more closely to a multiplicity of voices, to look in unexpected places, and to articulate a more refined language, we might restore the cultural autonomy of pre-modern texts in a way that might help us give account to the ways in which cultures in the Mediterranean came to be entangled.
The collection of essays that this volume offers does not in any way presume to solve the problem, nor even to model the use of the tools that this exposition could be seen to demand. Instead, what we have here are essays that attemptusing different methodologies applied to a variety of areas across the Mediterraneanto expose some of the assumptions about conflict and coexistence in the pre-modern Mediterranean that have governed the way we have been studying texts and languages.
Hussein Fancy opens the themed issue with his article on Alonso Pèrez de Guzmán, a Castilian nobleman who fought as a mercenary for the Marinid dynasty of Morocco in the late thirteenth century. His service in the western Maghreb is shrouded in myth. As each other when they went into battle against fellow Muslims, or was the idea to turn them, however temporarily, into a kind of walking oxymorona Muslim crusader? In working through these questions, Fancy shows how categories of contestation that were operative in the eastern Mediterranean made their presence felt in the western sphere as well, though not in ways we might expect. Alonso Pèrez would eventually return from his North African exile. His subsequent service and self-sacrifice on behalf of the Castilian crown would earn him the sobriquet Guzmán el Bueno from a grateful King Sancho IV. In the end, as Fancy demonstrates, the former mercenary's career may have affirmed as much as it transgressed the boundaries of religious allegiance that marked the western Mediterranean of his day.
Modern debates over the roles of religion and secularism in western Mediterranean history also come to the fore in Abigail Krasner Balbale's essay on the later Almohads. The Almohad dynasty ruled much of North Africa and Iberia between 1147 and 1269. While the collapse of the dynasty's power on the peninsula in the mid-thirteenth century is traditionally explained as the culmination of the Reconquista, Balbale shows that the political struggles of the era were seldom organised along strictly ethno-religious lines. Internal Almohad debates over what constituted righteous Islamic rule were another crucial factor in ending the caliphate. By shifting the focus away from inter-religious confrontation, Balbale challenges the caricatured contrasts sometimes drawn between allegedly fundamentalist, blinkered, jihad-inspired Berbers and tolerant, open-minded, alliance-seeking Andalusis. In her revisionist reading, the Almohads participated in and helped to foster the cultural flowering that enriched the entire western Mediterranean region in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In her reading, this flowering was less the manifestation of an Iberian Convivencia writ large than the culmination of trans-Mediterranean historical developments that North African sensibilities did much to foster.
While Balbale addresses high-level political contact, Luke Yarborough turns to social relations and the norms that were supposed to govern them. The question of sources is crucial here: given the lack of direct access to the voices of non-elite actors, how do we recover the lived experience of Muslims, Christians and Jews who interacted in medieval Spain? The legal texts that address medieval inter-religious relations are helpful here, but only to the extent that they lay out normative expectations: they explain how medieval people of different faiths should interact, not how they actually did. Yarbrough offers a potential way out of this impasse with his study of a literary anthology compiled by the Córdoban scholar Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1071). In his Bahjat al-majālis wa-uns almujālis wa-shah  dh al-dhāhin wa-l-hājis (evocatively translated by Yarbrough as "The Delight of the Learned Soirée, That Makes the Companion Gay and Points the Sagacious to What He Should Say"), Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr includes a chapter on "fraternising with someone not of your religion". The anecdotes presented there point to a more ambiguous moral vision of social relations between Muslims and non-Muslims than that offered in the better-studied juristic texts. By recuperating this ethical sensibility, Yarbrough opens the way toward more fully recuperating the social realities of eleventh-century Mediterranean life. He also suggests that the social teachings of religious authorities in the medieval Mediterranean may have been more pliable than is often presented.
While Balbale's paper deals with dynasts, and Yarborough's with non-elites, Ann Zimo connects the two social domains in her essay on Mamlūk naval strategy in the thirteenthcentury eastern Mediterranean. Zimo begins her story with a jailbreak. Some Mamlūk naval captains fell into Frankish captivity after their ships ran aground on reefs off Limassol as they attempted an ill-considered assault on Cyprus. Transferred to Acre, they languished in prison for three years until the Mamlūk sultan who had ordered the attack, Baybars al-Bunduqdārī (r. 658-676/1260-1277), arranged a bribe that secured their release. To understand their plight, Zimo links the fate of the captured pilots to Baybars's larger political project in the Levant. The Mamlūks are traditionally thought to have been sceptical about the value of naval power. But Zimo shows that Sultan Baybars devoted considerable time and money to building a fleet that could threaten Frankish shipping and coastal settlements. While the failed attack on Cyprus was a setback, his determination to spring the captains from captivity demonstrated his unwavering commitment to naval power. In this way, the captains owed their freedom to a central tenet of Mamlūk grand strategy.
The Mamlūks contested the sacred spaces of western Asia with the remnants of the Frankish settlements founded after the crusader conquest of Jerusalem in 1099. As Syrian outposts of Latin Christian Europe, these states have never fitted comfortably into the traditional categories of pre-modern history. They lie across a disciplinary fault line that has long haunted Mediterranean Studies. On one side is the "Islamic Mediterranean", which is the purview of departments of Near Eastern and Islamic Studies; on the other is "Medieval Europe", which is claimed by history departments. In "What Was Crusader about the Crusader States?" Christopher MacEvitt assesses the impact of this bifurcation on the historiography of the Frankish Levantine settlements. As MacEvitt shows, for reasons both practical (the difficulty of working across multiple language groups) and political (the colonial investments of some nineteenth-century European scholarship), the Crusades have usually been studied as an aspect of European history. The label "Crusader States" symbolised their connection to the European homeland. As a result of this academic gerrymandering, the Frankish settlements of the Levant have been subjected to a scholarly quarantine that has kept them apart from the Middle Eastern context in which their history actually unfolded. MacEvitt argues that in order to reintegrate the Frankish states into their appropriate historical environment, their history must be separated from that of the Crusades per se. Once the Frankish polities are reconceptualised as Middle Eastern states, crucial dimensions of their internal history can be approached with new analytical rigour. Most critically, focus can be shifted away from the Frankish ruling elite toward the indigenous communities that comprised the majority of their populations. With his call for renewed attention to the lost majority of "Frankish" Syria, MacEvitt joins in the larger project that this volume promotes: listening closely to the voices of medieval people who came from every corner of the Mediterranean world and engaged in all manner of conflicts and collaborations within and across religious lines.
